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Child soldiers are often viewed as a contemporary, ‘new war’ phenomenon but international 
concern about their use first emerged in response to anti-colonial liberation struggles. Youth 
were important actors in anti-colonial insurgencies, but their involvement has been neglected 
in existing historiographies of decolonization and counterinsurgency due to the absence and 
marginalization of youth voices in colonial archives. This article analyses the causes of youth 
insurgency and colonial counterinsurgency responses to their involvement in conflict between 
c.1945 and 1960, particularly comparing Kenya and Cyprus, but also drawing on evidence from 
Malaya, Indochina/Vietnam, and Algeria. It takes a generational lens, exploring the 
experiences of ‘youth insurgents’ primarily between the ages of twelve and twenty. Youth 
insurgents were most common where the legitimate grievances of youth were mobilized by 
anti-colonial groups who could recruit children through colonial organizations as well as family 
and social networks. Whilst some teenagers fought from coercion or necessity, others were 
politically motivated and willing to risk their lives for independence. Youth soldiers served in 
multiple capacities in insurgencies, from protestors to couriers to armed fighters, in roles which 
were shaped by multiple logics: the need for troop fortification and sustained manpower; the 
tactical exploitation of youth liminality, and the symbolic mobilization of childhood and 
discourses of childhood innocence. Counterinsurgency responses to youthful insurgents 
commonly combined violence and development, highlighting tensions within late colonial 
governance: juveniles were beaten, detained, and flogged, but also constructed as ‘delinquents’ 
rather than ‘terrorists’ to facilitate their subsequent ‘rehabilitation’.  
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 “these children, who were not born criminals or agitators, were victims of impulse, 
inducement and intimidation, but nevertheless had become terrorists fully capable of 
murder and devoid of any sense of moral responsibility”.1 
- Government report, “Corruption of Youth in 
Cyprus”.  
Children and youth were among the main casualties of insurgency and colonial 
counterinsurgency, both directly and indirectly. They were forcibly displaced during 
resettlement and villagization, detained, and separated from their families during urban 
clearances. They were killed or maimed during battles and beaten by security forces – or they 
watched such violence happening to friends and family. But not all children were victims or 
passive witnesses to liberation struggles: many became active participants. When the Cyprus 
Emergency erupted in 1955, “[t]he British were baffled to find that the enemy throwing bombs 
was a sixteen year old schoolboy, or that those distributing revolutionary leaflets were ten year 
olds from the primary school”, with children and youth involved in every activity from painting 
slogans to sabotage and assassinations.2 So why were children and youth so prominent in 
Cyprus, and were they as prominent or common in other liberation struggles? Were they 
politically-aware patriots, or duped and coerced children “corrupted” by various insurgent 
groups? And how did different colonial states respond: to what extent did children and youth 
become targets of counterinsurgency strategy, both enemy-centric and population-centric?  
                                                 
Many thanks to the peer reviewers and members of the ‘Understanding Insurgencies – 
Resonances from the Colonial Past’ research network, in whose workshops this article was 
developed, for their support and constructive feedback.  
1 Government of Cyprus, ‘Corruption of Youth in Support of Terrorism’ (Nicosia, 
Government Printer: 1957), p. 18.  
2 George Grivas-Dighenis and Charles Foley (ed.), The Memoirs of General Grivas (London: 
Longman, 1964), p. 36; Cyprus, ‘Corruption of Youth’, p. 11.  
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Recent comparative studies of colonial warfare have re-evaluated the extent and 
targeting of violence within counterinsurgency strategies, downplaying the significance of 
“hearts and minds” and stressing the centrality of coercion, but they have yet to fully analyze 
how strategies of both violence and development impacted upon different sections of 
“pacified” populations.3 Insurgencies have been studied as ethnic, sectarian, split by class and 
political ideology. More recently, feminist scholars in particular have applied a gendered lens 
to the study of counterinsurgency, arguing that the nature of conflict and people’s reasons for 
participating need to be read through gender norms and tensions, as well as race, class and 
religion.4 One vector of (counter-)insurgency has been neglected in these revisionist analyses 
however: age. The relative neglect of children and youth in studies of colonial insurgency and 
counterinsurgency is somewhat anomalous considering the firm linkages drawn between youth 
and nationalism in the decolonization era, and between youth and violent revolution in the 
twentieth century.5 This article will adopt a generational lens, deploying age as an organizing 
principle of its comparative analysis and focusing on the experiences of children and youth. 
The recruitment and utilization of children should be viewed not as a binary contrast to the 
recruitment of adults, but rather within the context of the wider mobilization of youth and the 
generational hierarchies that shaped independence struggles. As David Kilcullen has written, 
among the core principles of contemporary counterinsurgency is the need to “engage the 
women, beware the children”.6 But when did concern about the need to ‘beware’ children 
                                                 
3 See e.g. David French, The British Way in Counterinsurgency, 1945-67 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), Brian Drohan, Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and 
Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Empire (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2017).   
4 Laleh Khalili, ‘Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency’, Review of International Studies, 
37.4 (2010), 1-21; Laura Sjoberg, Gender, War and Conflict (London: Polity, 2014).  
5 See e.g. Richard Waller, ‘Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa’, Journal of African History, 
47.1 (2006), 77-92; Paul Sager, ‘Youth and Nationalism in Vichy Indochina’, Journal of 
Vietnamese Studies, 3.3 (2008), 291-301; Jon Abbink and Ineke van Kessel (eds.), Vandals or 
Vanguards: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2005).  
6 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2010), p. 40.  
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appear? This article will compare child and youth involvement in decolonization-era 
insurgencies and counterinsurgency responses across British and French empires, taking Kenya 
and Cyprus as key case studies due to visibility of youth in these conflicts and the resultant 
greater depth of archival evidence on their surveillance, detention and rehabilitation available, 
particularly following the release of the Migrated Archives.7 Comparing the Mau Mau rebellion 
in Kenya (1952-60) and the Cyprus Emergency (1955-59) allows analysis of different cultural, 
racial, rural and urban, and juvenile reform vectors that shaped the emergence and treatment of 
youth insurgency. This article argues that children and youth played a significant role in anti-
colonial liberation struggles. It represents the first step in a larger research project on late-
twentieth century global histories of child soldiering and serves to outline the broad patterns of 
child and youth insurgency and colonial responses. No single analytical framework explains 
the recruitment and use of child and youth soldiers in liberation struggle across multiple 
conflicts as their experiences and motivations varied widely, but key trends can be identified. 
Children and youth were mobilized through a combination of deliberate recruitment strategies, 
established social structures and networks, and their own variable levels and notions of agency. 
They seem to have been most numerous – or most visible – in totalizing insurgencies where 
whole communities were mobilized, in urban spaces, and where educational and social 
networks were sufficiently dense to facilitate targeted youth recruitment.  
Archival research reveals that there was little expectation from colonial authorities of 
children and youth being prominent in insurgencies in early security responses to colonial 
emergencies, but that awareness of their involvement rose after urban riots, curfews and mass 
detention brought children and youth into emergency courts and militarized spaces. Security 
forces, administrators and judges from Indochina to Ireland all became alert to the increasing 
                                                 
7 Evidence suggests that children and youth also contributed to anti-colonial insurgencies in 
Portuguese and Dutch empires but further research is required to substantiate the extent of 
their involvement.  
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numbers of teenagers who emerged shouting slogans, throwing bombs, and shooting guns, 
forcing a recognition of youth political and (para-)military capacities and the development of 
specific counterinsurgency spaces and sanctions to combat them. This article argues that there 
was no coordinated (trans-)imperial response to these youthful insurgents and little 
comparative discussion of policies towards youth within British or French colonies. Shaped by 
wider counterinsurgency strategy, colonial responses to insurgent youth combined violence 
and reform. As insurgencies progressed, children and youth became prime targets of 
development and social engineering within broader “hearts and minds” campaigns in addition 
to being targets of security force violence. Attempts to “rehabilitate” detained youth fighters 
were based on existing juvenile reform technologies that had been shaped by imperial and 
transnational penal and social welfare networks, creating common responses. Juvenile 
“terrorism” was read predominantly through existing analytical frameworks of “delinquency” 
rather than securitized lenses, with young insurgents being placed under the remits of social 
welfare and community development departments rather than military or prison officials.  
Childhood and youth are not universal categories but are rather historical and cultural 
constructs, sites of contestation between, and within, different colonial states and local 
communities.8 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, middle-class Westernized models of 
childhood were exported across the colonized world – models which themselves had been co-
constructed partly in response to racialized ideas of childhood imported back from the 
colonies.9 Whilst there were differences between British and French ideals of childhood, these 
models generally read children as innocent, nonsexual beings requiring protection from labor, 
                                                 
8 See Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, trans. Adam Phillips (London: Pimlico, 
[1960]1996); Allison James, Chris Jenks and Alan Prout, Theorizing Childhood (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, [1998]2015); David M. Pomfret, Youth and Empire: Trans-Colonial Childhoods 
in British and French Asia (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015).   
9 Paula S. Fass, ‘Childhood and Globalization’, Journal of Social History, 36.4 (2003), 963-
77; Pomfret, Youth and Empire.   
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sex and too rapid a transition into adulthood: a status that bore little resemblance to the lived 
realities of many colonized children, particularly those from poorer families.10 Constructions 
of childhood varied across ethnic cultures, social strata, and positions within families, and were 
also recast through processes of modernization, with biomedicine, urbanization and 
Christianity, and particularly Western education, changing expectations of children and 
childhood. But beyond these differences, there are sufficient commonalities to suggest that 
whereas metropolitan societies saw children as protected consumers, children in many African 
and Asian communities were viewed as producers, expected to provide labor to household 
economies and to contribute to the support and even defense of local communities in times of 
need. Military service itself could mark the transition from child or youth to adult. The line 
between childhood and youth was often blurry, with youth – or jeunesse – being a “shifter 
category” that is as much political as biological, but which usually denotes someone between 
the ages of fourteen and thirty-five, and of subaltern or marginalized social status.11 In late 
colonial contexts, youth also carried connotations of progression and modernity, and the 
challenging of generational authorities, as in the Malayan term pemuda that became 
synonymous with “revolutionary” during the Emergency there.12 It should be noted, however, 
that youth was implicitly and explicitly coded as male. Beyond puberty, girls tended to be 
categorized by their gender as “female” rather than by their age.13  
                                                 
10 Afua Twum-Danso, ‘The Political Child’, in Angela McIntyre (ed.), Invisible 
Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa (Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 
pp. 7-14; Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), pp. 40-45.   
11 See Deborah Durham, ‘Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa: Introduction to Parts 1 
and 2’, Anthropological Quarterly, 73.3 (2000), 113-20; Abbink and van Kessel (eds.), 
Vandals or Vanguards.  
12 Syed Muhd Aljunied, Radicals: Resistance and Protest in Colonial Malaya (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois Press, 2015), p. 61.  
13 See Jennifer Helgren & Colleen Vasconcellos (eds.), Girlhood: A Global History (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012).  
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Comparative analysis of youthful involvement in anti-colonial insurgencies is hindered 
by the absence of child and youth voices in official archives, and by the mutable and 
inconsistent usage of chronologically-bound colonial categories. The term “boy” in colonial 
parlance commonly invoked subordinate status rather than biological immaturity and was 
applied widely to adult males. In territories without standard birth registration, captured 
insurgents often provided only vague ages. Sometimes age was roughly determined by 
applying imprecise biological aging techniques, such as judging teeth, musculature, or bone 
growth.14 Child and juvenile status varied between colonies and departments. In British 
colonies, the upper age limit for “child” status varied between twelve and eighteen years across 
labor, education and legal categories. “Juvenile” was a legal category denoting someone under 
fifteen or sixteen years of age, but it could be used bureaucratically for those under the age of 
eighteen or sometimes nineteen, while as a moral category it became synonymous with 
“delinquent”.15 Moreover, in Malayan records, the age categories for “students” were variously 
given as twelve to twenty-five years, fifteen to twenty-five years or sixteen to thirty years.16 
Due to the slippery nature of these categories and imprecision in colonial records, this 
article will therefore analyze the involvement in anti-colonial insurgencies of individuals 
described as “child”, “juvenile” and “youth” in colonial archives, but focusing particularly on 
what Pignot terms “ado-combattants”: teenage or adolescent fighters, who appear across those 
colonial categories.17 Under current international humanitarian norms, “any person under 18 
years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any 
                                                 
14 Geoffrey W. Griffin, The Autobiography of Geoffrey W. Griffin, Kenya’s Champion 
Beggar, as narrated to Yusuf M. King’ala (Nairobi: Falcon Crest, 1952), p. 45.  
15 Waller, ‘Rebellious Youth’, 85.  
16 The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FCO 141/14597, Traffic of Chinese Students between 
Malaya and Communist China.  




capacity” is categorized as a child soldier. 18 However, as many youthful insurgents did not 
identify as “children” and were not regarded as such by either colonial authorities or their own 
communities, this article will instead adopt the terms “youth soldier” and “youth insurgent” to 
refer to individuals who were active in anti-colonial insurgencies between the approximate ages 
of twelve and twenty, the upper age limit being extended as many youth joined insurgent 
groups as under-eighteens but aged beyond that category during the conflict. Reflecting the 
fluid and clandestine nature of many insurgencies, analysis will not dwell solely on armed 
fighters and formal or oathed members of insurgent groups but will include activist and 
militarized children who engaged in illegal activities in support of insurgencies. Youth soldier 
will refer to those directly involved in armed violence and auxiliary roles with an affiliation to 
an armed group, youth insurgent to those involved more informally or in support roles or where 
the evidence regarding their level of involvement is unclear. The article will also, where 
appropriate, analyze the smaller cohort of children under the age of twelve who acted in support 
of insurgencies, although their involvement suggests different agential qualities and they were 
a lesser concern for colonial security forces. Category slippage and a lack of firm data on the 
ages or membership of most insurgent groups makes it difficult to quantify exact figures for 
youth soldiers/insurgents to show where they were most numerous, but inferences about the 
relative extent of youth soldiering in various insurgencies will be drawn from detention and 
court data.  
Child and youth voices rarely appear directly in these archives, which instead reveal 
bureaucratic discourses of counterinsurgency and colonial imaginings of youthful insurgency. 
The focus of this article is therefore both on adult representations of childhood and youth as 
legal categories and social concepts and on youths’ own experiences of liberation struggles, 
which will be drawn where possible from the memoirs and interviews of former youth 
                                                 
18 United Nations, ‘Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict’, 2007.  
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insurgents. The article does not claim that child and youth participation in anti-colonial 
insurgencies was as intensive as that which marked the “child soldier crisis” of the 1990-2000s, 
when developing human, and child, rights-based arguments and transnational politics of age 
recast the involvement of children in war as a rights abuse.19 However, their participation was 
more significant, in terms of numbers and impact, than has been acknowledged in public 
memory or the existing historiography, and contemporary child soldiering has deeper historical 
roots than is often recognized. 
 
The Emergence of the Youth Soldier as a Category of Concern: Youth Politicization, 
Mobilization and the Problem of Agency  
When child soldiering became a major humanitarian issue in the 1990s, it was depicted as a 
symptom of the “synchronous failure of ecological, political and economic systems of modern 
postcolonial states”, and of brutal and criminalized “new wars” and insurgencies.20 It was not, 
however, a new problem. Children and youth have fought in wars throughout history, but it 
was in the 1970s that this involvement became the object of international condemnation, with 
concern driven by developing human, and child, rights discourses.21 It was then conceptualized 
as a result of the forms of civilianized warfare deployed in anti-colonial struggles across Asia 
and Africa. The use of children in war was first formally prohibited within international 
humanitarian law in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, in articles 
proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose expansion into 
Africa and Asia brought youth insurgents to its delegates’ attention.22 Diplomatic negotiations 
                                                 
19 David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers in Western Imagination: From Patriots to Victims (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015).   
20 P. W. Singer, Children at War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 38-40.   
21 Pignot, L’Enfant Soldat.  
22 See International Committee of the Red Cross Archives, Geneva (CICR), B AG 051-097, 
Protection de la femme et de l’enfant dans le droit international humanitaire 1971. 
10 
 
over the Additional Protocols therefore explicitly linked the increasing use of children in war 
to “national liberation struggles with a legitimate defense or guerrilla warfare”.23 The opinions 
of national delegations were clearly molded by their political ideologies and experiences of 
anti-colonial insurgencies. The North Vietnamese delegate, Mr Van Luu, insisted that the use 
of children in conflict was “a result of colonial and neo-colonial wars”, and that they were 
“capable of acts which were inspired by noble feelings of patriotism or non-submission to a 
foreign occupying army”. Mrs Mantzoulinous of Greece was likely referencing Cyprus when 
arguing that “children under fifteen could hardly be expected to remain passive when 
confronted by aggression and the invasion of their country”, and that governments should be 
allowed to accept children serving in “auxiliary roles”. Whilst ICRC and many developing 
world countries supported defining “children” as anyone under eighteen years of age, Britain 
joined Greece and Vietnam in arguing that fifteen to eighteen-year olds “have the mental and 
physical capacity to fight and will wish to serve their country in time of need”, reflecting 
domestic military recruitment policy and colonial experiences.24 After extensive debate, the 
Additional Protocols outlawed the recruitment and use of children under the age of fifteen in 
conflict in line with existing international legal and rights-based definitions of childhood.25      
To understand why teenagers became discursively and materially significant to 
decolonization conflicts, the political, military and moral economies of insurgency which 
contributed to the recruitment of youth soldiers in these liberation struggles need to be assessed, 
as well as the intersections between shifting ideas of childhood and developing trends in 
                                                 
23 CICR, B AG 059 297-09, Protection des enfants en periode de conflit armé- consultation 
de l’UNICEF, 2 Nov 1971. 
24 ICRC, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 
Volume XV, CDDH/III/SR.45, pp. 64-75.  
25 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, I, art. 77 (2) and II, art. 
4(3)(c).   
11 
 
insurgent warfare that drove new logics of youth mobilization. Studies of child soldiering have 
frequently suggested that societies where children are economically productive contributors to 
society are more likely to see children drawn into armed groups, but we still lack quantitative 
evidence to support such claims.26 Similarly, “youth bulge” demographic structures frequently 
viewed contributing to contemporary civil war and youth violence, but whilst colonies were 
youthful populations, the significance of youth to insurgency was less a function of 
demography than a result of youth politicization.27 A more significant vector of youth 
soldiering in liberation struggles was the politicization of childhood and youth common across 
late-colonial governance and the consequent mobilization of younger generations by anti-
colonial forces.  
 As Richard Waller has argued regarding Kenya, colonialism relied on co-opting youth 
for its future, but it also enabled youth access to globalized cultures, educational resources and 
social spaces which allowed them to challenge both colonial authority and the gendered 
hierarchies that underpinned colonized societies.28 Late colonial states sought to harness the 
potentialities of childhood and youth, constituencies “identified as integral to nation building 
and the very project of becoming modern”.29 Colonial institutions like schools, youth clubs, 
sporting organizations and Scout troops were designed to socially engineer children and youth 
into disciplined colonial subjects but created new forms of generational identity and horizontal 
infrastructures that provided easy vectors for the spread of nationalist sentiment and subsequent 
                                                 
26 Astri Halsan Høiskar, ‘Underage and Underfire: An Enquiry into the Use of Child Soldiers 
1994-8’, Childhood, 6.3 (2001), 340-60. 
27 See Henrik Urdal, ‘A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 50.3 (2006), 607-29.  
28 Waller, ‘Rebellious Youth’, 79.  
29 Pomfret, Youth and Empire, p. 7. 
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mobilization. 30 The figure of youth then was “inherently doubled as both peril and promise”.31 
The 1920-40s saw a global trend towards youth mobilization, with Fascist and Communist 
youth movements highlighting the political potential of mobilizing younger generations to 
overturn existing structures of power, inspiring anti-colonial parties to co-opt youth’s 
rebellious energies to their causes.32 From the 1920s youth radicalism established a pattern for 
the political mobilization of (particularly urban) colonial students and youth, from the pemuda 
of Malaya to the Algerian jeunesse, and by the 1940s youth were increasingly contesting the 
more moderate politics of older anti-colonial activists.33  
For insurgencies which erupted during the early stages of decolonization, particularly 
those in Palestine, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia, the Second World War left significant 
legacies of youth mobilization and militarization which shaped children and youth’s 
involvement in insurgency. Children and youth were widely involved as soldiers and partisans 
in the Second World War, including many who fought for colonial armies.34 Giorgios Grivas, 
leader of EOKA (the National Organization of Cypriot Struggle), explained his deliberate 
recruitment of teenagers by stating “I had some experience of working with the young during 
the occupation, and later during the civil war in Greece, when time and time again, boys of 
                                                 
30 Sara Pursley, ‘The Stage of Adolescence: Anticolonial Time, Youth Insurgency and the 
Marriage Crisis in Hashimite Iraq’, History of the Present, 3.2 (2012), 160-97; Antigone 
Heraclidou, Imperial Control in Cyprus: Education and Political Manipulation in the British 
Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017); Jakob Krais, ‘The Sportive Origin of Revolution: Youth 
Movements and Generational Conflicts in Late Colonial Algeria’, Middle East – Topics & 
Argument, 9 (2017), 132-41.  
31 Omnia El Shakry, ‘Youth as Peril and Promise: The Emergence of Adolescent Psychology 
in Postwar Egypt’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 43 (2011), 592-3.  
32 See Alessio Ponzio, Shaping the New Man: Youth Training Regimes in Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2017).  
33 See Zohra Drif, Memoires d’une combattante de l’ALN: Zone Autonome d’Alger (Algiers: 
Chihab, 2011); Aljunied, Radicals.  
34 See David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers in Western Imagination: From Patriots to Victims 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015), pp. 76-101; John Mandambwe, with 
Mario Kolk (ed.), Can You Tell Me Why I Went to war? A Story of a Young King’s African 
Rifle Reverend Father John E. A. Mandambwe (Zomba: Kachere Books, 2007). 
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sixteen and seventeen proved themselves equal or superior to mature men”.35 Total warfare 
established patterns of utilizing children as force multipliers during periods of increased 
manpower demands. Moreover, it established the significance of youth mobilization to 
sustaining colonial regimes, creating horizontal networks of association that could be hijacked 
or subverted by anti-colonial forces. French colonies in particular invested in youth 
organizations as part of social engineering efforts. In Cochinchina, Vichy youth and sport 
networks were transformed into a “region-wide paramilitary Vanguard Youth”, which in 
August 1945 was assimilated into the Viet Minh.36 Japanese occupying forces in Indochina, 
Malaya and Indonesia similarly sought to harness the energies and loyalties of youth, 
establishing youth and paramilitary organizations like the Giyu Gun and Patriotic Youth, 
providing pathways for later youth mobilization by anti-colonial insurgents.37 For children who 
grew up under Japanese occupation, war and violence became normalized.38 Colonial 
authorities in Malaya attributed youthful insurgency there to “many hundreds of young 
detained persons spen[ding] their formative years without normal education during the 
Japanese occupation of 1942-5” or suffering the loss of their parents, leading to a “problem of 
delinquency”.39  
The breakdown of generational authority and resultant juvenile delinquency became 
key explanatory frameworks for colonial officials seeking to understand, and counter, youth 
insurgency, particularly in British colonies. The post-war years established the figure of the 
                                                 
35 Grivas-Dighenis and Foley (ed.), Memoirs, p. 28.  
36 Anne Raffin, Youth Mobilization in Vichy Indochina and its Legacies, 1940 to 1970 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 195.  
37 Ibid., p. 196; Aljunied, Radicals. 
38 Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Boston, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), p. 43.  
39 Tim Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 187; TNA, CO 1022/132, Detention Orders, ‘Detention and 
Deportation during the Emergency in the Federation of Malaya’, p. 10.  
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delinquent as a major object of global welfarist concern and a metonymy for the fears of 
colonial officials, local elites and community elders about the deleterious impact of 
urbanization, detribalization and modernity on colonized youth.40 Parallels were drawn 
discursively between the newly-emerged category of adolescence as a stage of psychological 
and of national life, the “liminal category that marked the threshold between childhood and 
adulthood [being] a perfect metaphor for the political and social transformation from colony to 
independent nation”, although administrations generally retained the terminology of juvenile 
and youth rather than adolescent or teenager.41 In Kenya, officials such as Thomas Askwith 
and Louis Leakey argued that Mau Mau was driven by a break down in tribal discipline and 
traditional socialization caused by too-rapid a modernization of Gikuyu society: “A whole 
generation has disintegrated”.42 Historically, as today, Western constructions of childhood 
served as a global disciplinary tool and moralizing practice, blaming “violent” or “vulnerable” 
children on the failings of indigenous social structures and cultures.43 Juvenile delinquents, 
“young toughs”, “thugs” and “hooligans” were thereby identified as “strong recruiting 
grounds” for anti-colonial groups in Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus; discursively, colonial 
language shifted from “child” to “juvenile” or “youth” when it sought to deny young insurgents 
access to the political category of childhood and its connotations of innocence and justify 
security measures against them.44 Rather than recognizing the legitimate grievances of youth, 
                                                 
40 Stacey Hynd, ‘Pickpockets, Pilot Boys and Prostitutes: The Construction of Juvenile 
Delinquency in the Gold Coast, c.1929-57’, Journal of West African History, 4.2 (2018), 48-
74.  
41 Pursley, ‘The Stage of Adolescence’, 160; El Shakry, ‘Youth as Peril and Promise’, 592-3. 
42 Kenyan National Archives (KNA), BZ/16/1, Mau Mau Youth Offenders, East African 
Standard, ‘Rehabilitation of Mau Mau Detainees’, 3 June 1954; L. S. B. Leakey, Mau Mau 
and the Kikuyu (London: Routledge, 1952), pp. 78-80.   
43 Sharon Stephens, ‘Children and the Politics of Culture in Late Capitalism’, in Sharon 
Stephens (ed.), Children and the Politics of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), pp. 3-48.  
44 TNA, CO 859/660, Save the Children – Kenya, Brigadier Boyce, ‘Children of Kenya’, 
Corona, 5 May 1955.  
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officials preferred to explain child and youth militancy through a breakdown of generational 
authority and failed parenting.45 The Cyprus government openly blamed a lack of “parental 
control” for children’s participation in anti-colonial actions.46 Youthful militancy there was not 
seen as stemming from inherent criminality or “anti-social behavior”, but from a “complete 
lack of discipline at...a difficult age”.47 But juvenile delinquency was both a cause and a 
consequence of colonial counterinsurgency: newspapers in 1954 described Nairobi in the wake 
of Operation Anvil as being “invaded by child gangsters…Thousands of African children, their 
lives disrupted by the terrorist struggle, are flooding into Nairobi to live as criminals”.48 As 
Burman argues, for children in conflict situations “[i]f the price of innocence is passivity, then 
the cost of resourcefully dealing with conditions of distress and deprivation is to be 
pathologized”.49 
Youth politicization and radicalism was driven by growing socio-economic grievances, 
as well as political repression.50 Colonialism generated unprecedented levels of tension 
between the young and gerontocratic power structures; tensions that were driven by the 
contradictory ramifications of globalized modernity and the colonial project, and which 
inevitably shaped anti-colonial movements. Particularly after 1945, many young people found 
themselves struggling with access to education, unemployment or underemployment, and were 
consequently unable to marry and establish their own households. In Kenya, Ocobock argues 
that coming of age stalled in the 1950s, with many youth trapped between childhood and 
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adulthood.51 This period of what Summers has termed “waithood” created a moral economy of 
civil war that hinged on generational as well as ethnic and anti-colonial tensions.52  
Generational tensions are historically recurrent; from pre-colonial to contemporary eras, 
communities in Kenya, as elsewhere, have seen a reluctance of elders to accord youth agency 
and fears youth were attempting to usurp elders’ power and responsibilities, subverting 
generational hierarchies. As Lonsdale argues, Mau Mau rebellion was regarded by many 
Kikuyu elders and the colonial state as the epitome of “youth gone bad”.53 From the perspective 
of the forest fighters themselves, joining Mau Mau marked the beginning of a new, alternative 
form of manhood as existing pathways were blocked by colonial or elder authorities.54  
Whilst colonial authorities and adults feared youth agency and desires for personal 
advancement and independence, some insurgent leaders sought to capitalize on youth 
psychology, viewing them as naturally rebellious and mentally pliable.55 The most deliberate 
and strategic recruitment of youth was undertaken in Cyprus, where, with staunch support for 
the Orthodox church and some ninety percent of children receiving elementary education, 
schools, churches and youth organizations became prime vectors of recruitment.56 As French 
notes, “the outstanding feature of EOKA’s rank and file was their youth”, with the most active 
members being between sixteen and twenty-five.57 This was due to Grivas’ decision to “turn 
the youth into the seedbed of EOKA”; “above all, I concentrated on the young”. For Grivas, 
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the active and rebellious nature of youth predisposed them to insurgent action: “It is among the 
young people that one finds audacity, the love of taking risks, and the first great and difficult 
achievements”, and he claimed responsibility for their involvement.58 Colonial narratives 
frequently depict youth as objects of adult indoctrination, exploitation and intimidation, rather 
than as active recruits and volunteers, denying their agency. Colonial authorities in Kenya and 
Cyprus typically described juveniles as being either “kidnapped or coerced” into joining armed 
groups or indoctrinated into supporting anti-colonial causes.59 Certainly in Kenya, urban youth 
gangs, family networks and oathing ceremonies by Mau Mau gangs were key pathways for 
youth to join the rebellion, pathways that could shade from voluntary to coercive depending 
upon individual and circumstance.60 A 1957 report on the “corruption of youth” in Cyprus 
lambasted the “grooming” and “seducing” of Cypriot youth by EOKA, decrying that teenagers 
had been “perverted from a natural abhorrence of crime…only to be abandoned when they 
have served their purpose – with every prospect that their lawless generation will become an 
easy prey to communism”.61 Youth became a key politico-ideological battleground in the Cold 
War and colonial states repeatedly expressed concerns about Communist infiltration of youth 
groups, a phenomenon that was present in the Malayan emergency but wildly exaggerated in 
colonies like Cyprus.62  
Agency is a problematic concept to apply to children and youth, particularly from the 
traces that exist in colonial archives of colonized youths struggling to build their own identities 
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and futures amidst the fight for their communities’ own independence.63 Reading against the 
grain of the racialized generational hierarchies of power that suffuse archival texts and 
accessing former youth soldiers’ accounts, however, suggests that many youths, particularly 
older teens, displayed political resistance and determination to join liberation struggles. Many 
of their narratives are expressly politicized, stressing that their political consciousness was 
central to their voluntary enlistment.64 With no children, households or careers of their own, 
youth faced fewer obstacles to entry into armed groups. Some even acted as radicalizing agents 
for militant groups, pushing “adults into higher levels of activism, rebellion and terrorism”.65 
What might appear to be a clear example of agency and a rational decision to enlist, however, 
was likely influenced by post-conflict memory and experience, and undergirded by multiple 
motivations “that exceed rational action and articulated intention to include collective fantasies, 
psychical desires and the struggle just to get by”, including desires for revenge for their 
families’ mistreatment, peer pressure and a desire to belong, personal advancement or influence 
by (ethno-)nationalist or communist ideologies.66 Other youth soldiers demonstrate what has 
been described as tactical or circumscribed agency: being unable to escape involvement in 
conflict but volunteering for certain roles whilst resisting other duties, and younger children 
notably had a more restricted capacity for independent action, socially and psychologically.67  
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Logics of Youth Soldiering: Troop Fortification, Teenage Liminality and Symbolic 
Childhoods 
Youth soldiers served in multiple capacities throughout anti-colonial insurgencies, from 
frontline to intelligence collection and auxiliary roles depending on the nature of that 
insurgency, often graduating from the latter to the former: as one Special Branch officer in 
Cyprus noted, “schoolchildren are enlisted in their teens into leaflet groups and receive 
progressive promotion to bomb, sabotage and killer groups”.68 Multiple, sometimes 
overlapping, logics underpinned this diversity of roles, shaped by the variable tactics and 
strength of insurgent groups. On one level, children and youth served simply as troop fortifiers 
increasing or sustaining the manpower of armed groups and movements. Youth soldiering here 
was a function of asymmetrical warfare, with an instrumental use of children and youth as a 
significant population resource in ways that were not determined or classified by their age. This 
was particularly the case in insurgencies characterized by peasant political economies and mass 
mobilization, like Malaya and Indochina, where teenage boys and girls were recruited as 
physically-capable violence workers. Children and youth often functioned as force multipliers, 
serving in auxiliary capacities before being mobilized as combatants on the frontline during 
more protracted conflicts. Teenagers and students, both male and female, played a significant 
role in the Algerian revolution, where tensions between Islamic and French notions of modern 
generational and gender norms shaped ideological battlegrounds.69 Girls and young women 
were rarely accepted in frontline roles as National Liberation Front (FLN) armed combatants, 
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due more to their gender than age, but these mujahidat performed important logistical support 
capacities for rural maquis, as couriers, cooks, washerwomen or nurses. 70  
In prolonged conflicts, the use of youth soldiers increased as the war dragged on and 
new recruits were needed to sustain manpower. David Anderson has shown that as insurgency 
intensified in Kenya, those conscripted into Mau Mau ranks were appreciably younger than 
those who had joined at the start of the Emergency.71 By late 1956 Special Branch officers in 
Cyprus recorded “youths being up-graded to killers at a much earlier age”, from fifteen years 
old.72 By the time of the Second Indochina War, separate units had been established for 
teenagers, such as the Youth Guerrillas, Ho Chi Minh’s Child Pioneers, and the Youth Shock 
Brigades who “went in first and returned last”, opening roads and burying the dead. Guillemot 
estimates that the Youth Shock Brigade had a total membership of 220-350,000 during the first 
and second Indochina wars, most of whom were fifteen to twenty years old with around half 
Brigade members being female. Some 8000 children are thought to have been involved in the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu.73 In South Vietnam, Vichy-era colonial youth projects were 
transformed from 1960-63 into an armed forced by the Diem regime in South Vietnam. 
Republic Youth programs, with their female auxiliaries, and the Combat Youth mobilized rural 
youth to become community self-defense groups, “acting as guerrilla forces to place the Viet 
Cong on the defensive”, guarding strategic hamlets and receiving military training.74  
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On a second level, children and youth were utilized in a manner that exploited their 
youthful liminality: physically able to undertake roles normatively fulfilled by adults, but 
culturally and discursively categorized as ‘civilian/child’ rather than ‘combatant/adult’ and 
therefore less likely to draw the attention of security forces or be exposed to the full force of 
colonial law. Tactical flexibility was key to the success of insurgent forces, and youth liminality 
was a significant force fueling this flexibility. Youth soldiers offered significant tactical 
advantages in intelligence activities such as scouting, spying and couriering, during which they 
replicated normative childhood duties or behaviors to avoid drawing enemy attention, such as 
playing, housework, or running errands. Memoirs from Pham Thang and Phung Quan highlight 
how the Viet Minh exploited the small stature and presumed innocence of children to deploy 
boys between the ages of twelve and fifteen as messengers and scouts.75 In Algeria, children 
were similarly used by revolutionary forces as messengers or spies, with girls and young 
women operating as part of urban networks, exploiting assumptions of female innocence and 
the inviolability of female bodies in public to smuggle goods, bombs and intelligence, as in the 
battle of Algiers.76 For boys, the Scouts Musulmanes Algeriens [SMA] was a nationalist youth 
movement that became a key recruiting ground for the FLN, with thousands of routiers (Rover 
Scouts, usually aged seventeen to twenty-five years of age) using their training to join the 
maquis, prompting French military intelligence to assert the SMA was in effect a “clandestine 
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army”.77 Scouting proved to be “both an instrument of colonial authority and a subversive 
challenge to the legitimacy of empire” in both French and British colonies.78 
The dissonance between constructions of youthful innocence and the realities of youth 
capacity for action was starkest around incidences of armed violence. Youthful liminality was 
exploited to the full in situations such as the arrest of a sixteen-year old boy in Paphos for 
carrying a loaded submachine gun in his violin case, or when the Pancyprian Academy for 
Girls was closed after demonstrating schoolgirls decoyed security forces into a bomb ambush 
in which one soldier and one policeman were killed.79 Insurgent groups sought to exploit the 
gap between violent youth action and legal accountability by deploying teenagers for lethal 
assaults. In both Kenya and Cyprus authorities asserted that insurgents were deliberately using 
adolescents to conduct assassinations “knowing full well that they would not be hanged by 
reason of their age”, with colonial legislation forbidding the execution of anyone under the age 
of eighteen.80 The Cyprus government repeatedly argued that “teenage bomb throwers and 
assassins were preferred” by EOKA.81  
The use of children and youth as troop fortifiers and the mobilization of youth liminality 
both held historical precedence in conflict, most recently with the “boy soldiers” and partisan 
groups of the Second World War.82 Anti-colonial insurgencies however inculcated a new logic 
of youth soldiering: that of the symbolic mobilization of childhood as a psychological tactic of 
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warfare. In 1950-60s anti-colonial insurgencies became increasingly internationalized and 
colonial counterinsurgency evermore subject to human rights critiques. Humanitarian and 
human rights groups increased their engagement with Africa and Asia, and although 
humanitarian groups remained primarily focused on infants and young children as the objects 
of aid rather than teenagers, the mistreatment of youth insurgents by security forces and in 
detention did attract attention from ICRC delegates and others. The political mobilization of 
children in support of insurgent campaigns through involving school children in protests and 
riots became an effective guerrilla tactic, leveraging colonial constructions of childhood against 
colonial regimes. It occurred mainly in urban guerrilla conflicts, enacted by insurgent groups 
like EOKA and the FLN with international support and propaganda strategies, and was 
consequently notably absent in Mau Mau.83 Colonial interventions into childhood had 
historically been justified as part of the “civilizing mission”, raising children from the 
“primitiveness” and “barbarity” of indigenous cultures.84 But in the 1950-70s, insurgent groups 
harnessed modern media technologies and exploited Western notions of the innocence and 
passivity of children to highlight the barbarity of colonial state violence targeted against school 
children; the purported beneficiaries of colonial modernity who were now driven to protest 
against its inequities. With insurgencies increasingly being fought via public relations and 
media as well as on the ground, children became important sources of propaganda.85 School 
children made ideal demonstrators as they were assumed in popular and international media 
discourses to be innocent and naturally apolitical, with any action against them “rais[ing] the 
cry of brutality”.86 EOKA deliberately deployed schoolchildren as part of their urban clashes 
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with British forces, knowing that images of government troops “beating schoolboy rioters” 
would generate significant international outcry; especially because the schoolboys were 
white.87 Many demonstrations in Cyprus involved up to 1500 school pupils, with politically-
active older pupils and siblings encouraging younger ones to participate, and others drawn in 
by group mentalities and the chance for excitement.88 The participation of secondary and 
elementary schoolchildren served both symbolic and strategic purposes simultaneously, 
showing the world “that the whole of Cyprus, from the smallest schoolgirl to the Archbishop 
himself, was in the battle” for freedom, whilst at the same time alleviating pressure on EOKA 
mountain gangs by focusing security force attention on the towns.89  
Child and youth soldiers also assumed particular cultural and symbolic significance 
during the first Indochina War. As Goscha argues, this was one of the most “socially totalizing 
wars” in modern history.90 As the war raged on, children in Communist Vietnam became 
considered “citizen-soldiers capable of making great sacrifices and deserving of honour and 
praise”.91 Child and youth soldiers became particularly important as “new heroes” and martyrs 
for patriotic emulation campaigns designed to promote revolutionary warfare and mass 
mobilization. One such was fifteen-year-old Ly Tu Trong, executed for killing a French secret 
agent, who proclaimed at his trial that “there is only one true path to adulthood, and that is the 
revolutionary one!”92 
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Children and youth were not regarded as security threats at the outbreak of hostilities, as 
security forces and political elites were culturally conditioned to equate ‘combatant’ with 
‘adult’, so initial security orders identified them as civilians who were not legitimate targets of 
direct violence.93 However, as conflicts deepened and the lines between civilian and enemy 
combatant became increasingly blurred, state targeting of children and youth by security forces 
emerged. In Kenya, by mid-1954 juveniles had been identified as a “social menace” and 
“serious security risk”.94 Security personnel reported juveniles in Nairobi being used as Mau 
Mau couriers, scouts and “active agents”’, leading Special Branch to “interrogate them at 
length” in screening centers: a process that usually involved physical and/or psychological 
violence.95 Branche posits that in the early stages of the Algerian war French military forces 
did not consider women or children to be military targets, but by 1957 increasing numbers of 
teenagers were being detained, most commonly in Constantine province and Petite Kabylie, 
where separate Centre de Triage et Transit camps were built for young detainees. As in Mau 
Mau, many Algerian youths were detained for minor infractions and officials often typecast 
young children not as “the enemy”’ but rather as victims led astray by their parents. Captured 
youth insurgents were sent to Youth Education camps. As the conflict wore on however, 
military forces drew fewer distinctions between child/adult and civilian/military, with juveniles 
being held in the same conditions as adults and those older than fourteen could be arrested and 
tortured like an adult.96 Colonial archives contain little direct evidence of children and youth 
                                                 
93 Many were in/directly targeted and wounded during security operations however, revealing 
the clash between policy and practice.  
94 KNA, AH/14/25, Minute Secretariat meeting, 15 July 1954; Secretary War Council to 
Minister for Defence, Nairobi, 19 June 1954.  
95 KNA, AH/14/25, Control of Juveniles: Memorandum by the Emergency Joint Staff, 
December 1954; BZ 16/1/11, Juvenile Mau Mau cases, Colin Owen to PC Rift Valley, 21 
April 1953.  




serving in colonial security forces as informers, agents or soldiers.97 Traces do emerge in 
media, humanitarian accounts and memoirs however, in patterns replicating children’s 
auxiliary use in insurgent forces. Ujana Park juvenile detention camp in Kenya was reported to 
hold ‘some orphans who have worked for the security forces in minor roles’.98 Loyalist 
paramilitary or Home Guard units are likely to have included local youth as armed fighters, 
with recruitment undertaken along clientelist and patrimonial lines.99 Some juvenile insurgents 
were flipped by security forces to work for them, providing local intelligence and necessary 
skills, such as Saïd Ferdi whose memoirs recount his experiences as a chouf (sentry) for the 
FLN, before being arrested by a French patrol aged thirteen, detained and tortured, and 
subsequently agreeing to work as a translator for French forces.100  
What really drew colonial authorities’ attention to the emergence of youth as a 
significant presence in anti-colonial insurgency was the appearance of children in courts which, 
particularly in Cyprus and Kenya generated sufficient concern to be separately recorded in 
legal and administrative archives. In Cyprus, children and youth were among the first people 
arrested on Emergency offences.101 French notes that thirty-two percent of individuals brought 
to trial were high school students.102 Judges and police certainly complained that juvenile 
offending was “daily demonstrated” in Special Courts.103 Annual reports establish that between 
1955 and 1959 1073 juveniles under the age of sixteen were charged with Emergency offences 
and 894 of those were convicted, primarily for breaking curfew, illegal strikes, unlawful 
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assemblies and riots or other offences “against social order”, and against firearms legislation.104 
Meanwhile, in 1955 alone there were 2571 convictions for juveniles under Mau Mau 
Emergency regulations.105 The sanctioning of these juvenile insurgents was shaped by tensions 
between punishment, deterrence and reform which were characteristic of late colonial penalty, 
where notions of judicial leniency and welfarist reform that dominated the rhetoric of colonial 
governance clashed with the reality of continued penal violence and the brutality of Emergency 
detention.  
Colonial courts struggled to determine what the most effective and appropriate 
sanctions were for deterring and punishing youth insurgents. Generally, colonial legal officials 
were reluctant to sentence juveniles to imprisonment, fearing that they would be radicalized 
and corrupted (or sexually exploited) by adult insurgents. Other normative peace-time 
sanctions - fining and being bound - over referred responsibility onto families but as Governor 
Hardy bemoaned in Cyprus, “[i]t is clear that neither their parents nor the school authorities 
are able to control them”.106 To provide a more forceful response, a “unanimous” decision was 
taken to allow corporal punishment of boys up to the age of eighteen charged with Emergency 
offences on the grounds that “whipping” was an “appropriate” and “humane” punishment for 
disciplining boys.107 Corporal punishment had long been regarded as an effective and 
culturally-appropriate sanction for disciplining colonized bodies within the British Empire, and 
for male youth in particular.108 The Migrated Archives in Kew record ninety-six whipping 
sentences between December 1955 and September 1956, with between eight and twelve lashes 
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inflicted.109 In total, some 154 boys were sentenced to be caned by the end of 1956, sixty of 
whom were under the age of sixteen.110 But with Greece bringing a case to the European Court 
of Human Rights over the Cyprus Emergency, Britain became wary of potentially scandalous 
forms of counterinsurgency violence, and carefully monitored its use against juveniles. In this 
context, caning boys proved counter-productive and was greeted with revulsion by Greek and 
Greek-Cypriot communities for whom it was not a culturally-normative sanction.111 It also 
caused concern in American media and diplomatic circles, leading the Foreign Office to request 
Cypriot authorities rebrand the practice as “caning” to render it more palatable to international 
opinion.112 Such controversy led to the power of Special Courts to impose corporal punishment 
being revoked in December 1956.113 Outrage over the physical punishment of youthful 
insurgents was distinctly contingent and racialized however: no concern was raised over the 
simultaneous and more widespread use of corporal punishment against juvenile offenders in 
Kenya, where 3197 young persons were caned for Mau Mau-related offences in 1955 alone.114  
Whilst youth soldiers were frequently physically sanctioned through corporal 
punishment, they were at least largely spared the threat of capital punishment as laws forbade 
the execution of anyone under eighteen years old; something insurgent forces exploited. In 
Kenya, where the use of capital punishment was most extensive, with 1499 Emergency-related 
capital sentences handed down and 1090 executions, 151 male juveniles and between two and 
seventeen females were sentenced to death for Mau Mau offences but had their sentences 
                                                 
109 TNA, FCO 141/3795, Collation of Material, 1956.  
110 Cyprus, Annual Report for the Year ending 1956, Justice.  
111 TNA, FCO 141/3666, Corporal Punishment of Boys 1955, L. Durrell to L. Glass, 11 
January 1956.  
112 Ibid., PEAKE to POMEF, 14 December 1955.  
113 Cyprus, Annual Report for the Year ending 1956, Justice.  
114 TNA, CO 822/1239, Detention of Juvenile Delinquents in Kenya, 1957-9, Parliamentary 
Questions, 10 May 1957.  
29 
 
commuted due to their age.115 In Cyprus, between April 1955 and February 1957 136 under 
eighteens were prosecuted for what had become capital offences, with a further 474 suspected 
of such offences.116 Concern about “an increase in terrorist activity by youths between sixteen 
and eighteen, whom EOKA are now employing to shoot people” led senior police and legal 
officers to oppose metropolitan proposals to raise the minimum age for the death penalty from 
sixteen to eighteen years, with the Chief Justice stating anyone between those ages convicted 
of murder “should hang”.117 Although London forced the minimum age to be set at eighteen to 
avoid international condemnation, it is significant that the nine Cypriots who were executed 
for terrorist offences were all aged nineteen to twenty-three, their hangings being intended to 
serve as a deterrent against youth violence.118 The youthfulness of these hanged men drew 
international diplomatic condemnation, with the Greek ambassador to the United Nations 
describing Evagoras Pallikarides’ hanging as “an unprecedented political murder, with a 
teenager as its victim”.119  
For many youth insurgents, their seizure by colonial security forces ended in detention 
or imprisonment. To contain them, colonial administrations consequently developed a mix of 
detention camps, approved schools, youth camps, and juvenile reformatories, which were run 
by a combination of probation officers, former military personnel, prison officers, welfare 
workers, humanitarians and missionaries, leading juvenile detention and reform to be shaped 
by competing logics of violence and welfare. Numerous studies have revealed the violence and 
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brutality inherent in colonial detention, and youth were not exempt from such treatment.120 In 
Cyprus, of the 1118 men in detention in June 1957, twenty percent were nineteen or younger.121 
ICRC files note concerns about the “extreme youth of a large number of detainees”, many of 
whom could “physically, be considered as children”, and their poor treatment in detention. 
Delegates conducting prison visits wrote confidential reports to Geneva that detention had the 
“same psychological effect on these youths as joining the army in times of war” and “after this 
experience they are not morally prepared to return to school”.122 Accounts were submitted of 
young detainees being kicked and beaten with batons, to the point of requiring 
hospitalization.123 In corroboration, colonial records detail “young terrorists” participating in 
riots and hunger strikes over poor conditions.124  
In Kenya, by mid-1955 some 67,000 persons were detained or imprisoned for Mau Mau 
offences.125 Among these were over 2000 boys under the age of eighteen and nearly 1000 
girls.126 Juvenile detainees were originally held alongside adults, where “they spent their entire 
day sitting with their feet in a drain, their bodies shrouded in blankets or sacks, and their minds 
and hearts revolving in wicked circles”.127  Medical, moral and ideological concerns soon drove 
the segregation of juvenile detainees, following overcrowding, fear of radicalization by 
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hardcore adult detainees, and reports of “improper sexual relations [with] young uncircumcised 
boys having been procured”.128 Quaker social worker Eileen Fletcher and her supporters raised 
alarm in parliament and the media about the abuse and neglect of children – particularly girls 
– in detention.129 Whilst the British government attempted to discredit Fletcher and manipulate 
the age of girls to deny they were “juveniles” and thereby deserving of protections, evidence 
from Kenyan archives supports her claims of maltreatment. Young girls detained in Kamiti 
petitioned the government concerning their treatment, questioning whether “a child of you aged 
12 years carry a stone weights 2 ½ by 10” taking little food like that. Besides that we are beaten 
by order of a chief warder [sic]”.130 
 
Welfare and Development Interventions – Reforming Young “Hearts and Minds”  
 
As it became clear that coercion and punishment were insufficient to deter youth insurgents, 
and that insurgencies could not be ended through violence alone, children and youth became 
significant targets of development and social engineering in “hearts and minds” campaigns 
across both British and French empires, although it should be noted that developmental 
interventions were consistently under-funded and under-resourced, and consequently failed to 
capture either the hearts or the minds of child and youth populations.131 Villagization, the 
forcible resettlement and concentration of civilian population to combat rural insurgency which 
formed a key pillar of counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya, Kenya and Algeria, had a strong 
youth focus as children were the largest demographic of the resettled population and the most 
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vulnerable, with high mortality and morbidity rates reported in Kenya and Algeria.132 In Kenya, 
non-governmental organizations including the British Red Cross and Save the Children were 
heavily involved in supplying humanitarian aid and developmental support for villagized 
communities, with a particular focus on infant and child healthcare.133 After 1955, colonial 
officials increasingly viewed the Mau Mau Emergency as a social welfare problem, with 
probation and community development staff sent to the Kikuyu reserves to oversee the 
“rehabilitation” of the Kikuyu family, instituting communal confessions to “purge” families of 
Mau Mau adherence and ready them for home craft, child care and agricultural classes.134  
Education was a key focus of population-centric counterinsurgency, but one which 
reflected the ambivalences of the colonial project. Schools that were supposed to train children 
to be productive and obedient colonized subjects became spaces of youth politicization, 
resistance and recruitment into insurgency; if not by armed groups directly, then by peers 
seeking to politicize their classmates.135 With high levels of school enrollment, Greek 
Gymnasia schools in Cyprus became a major recruiting ground for EOKA, with Governor 
Harding viewing them as “a dangerous agency for the organized intimidation and the disruption 
of society”. 136 This led authorities to ‘de-Hellenise’ education in an attempt to counteract the 
cultural nationalism of the Greek schools, prompting a backlash of student agitation. During 
the “Battle of the Flags” over student attempts to remove British flags from school grounds, 
the Cyprus government responded to student militancy by enforcing school closures to the 
                                                 
132 Moritz Feichtinger, ‘Villagization: A People’s History of Strategic Resettlement and 
Violent Transformation in Kenya and Algeria, 1955-62’ (University of Bern PhD 
dissertation, 2015), p. 245.  
133 Emily Baughan, ‘Rehabilitating an Empire: Humanitarian Collusion with the Colonial 
State during the Kenyan Emergency, ca. 1954-60’, Journal of British Studies, 59.1 (2020), 
57-79.  
134 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, p. 110. Kenya’s rehabilitation program drew inspiration from 
Malaya’s emergency welfare measures.  
135 Heraclidou, Imperial Control in Cyprus; Harper, The End of Empire, p. 193.  
136 TNA, CO 926/190, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 31 December 1955.  
33 
 
extent that Cyprus’ education system almost collapsed.137 Up to 419 of 722 elementary schools 
and eighteen of fifty-seven secondary schools were closed at any point during 1955-6. It was 
noted however that school closures merely gave youth more time and opportunity to support 
EOKA’s activities, rather than dissuading them.138 Education was also a site of intense conflict 
during Mau Mau, with Kikuyu Independent Schooling Association schools being forcibly 
closed following alleged Mau Mau infiltration whilst Mau Mau fighters targeted Christian 
mission schools that failed to support the movement, burning down approximately fifty schools 
in 1953.139 School fees were sometimes lifted for Home Guards’ children whereas teenagers 
suspected of taking an oath were not allowed to leave villages for schooling.140 In Algeria, 
education became a major focus of “hearts and minds” programming following the Constantine 
Plan, with schools run by the Service de formation de la jeunesse algérienne inside resettlement 
villages providing a key element of psychological warfare.141 Some 40,000 children were 
enrolled in New Village schools in Malaya by 1952 which were intended “to stand for progress 
and enlightenment and the development of Malayan national consciousness” to create 
modernized colonial youth subjects and counter Communist influence, but these were admitted 
to be poorly run and ineffectual.142 British authorities also restricted the transnational 
movement of students from China to Malaya, and from Greece or Turkey to Cyprus to prevent 
externally-trained activists fueling insurgencies.143 
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Whilst general social welfare and community development interventions sought to 
prevent the capture of young minds by anti-colonial forces, youth insurgents and youth soldiers 
who had been apprehended by security services required more targeted reform. Rehabilitation 
programs for those categorized as juvenile detainees blended colonial understandings of local 
age relations and global technologies of juvenile reform with the aim of constructing productive 
colonial subjects. Late colonial penal reform had already seized upon juvenile delinquents as a 
“manageable, malleable” category of offenders whose “rehabilitation” offered a way of 
reclaiming the future, so these techniques were transferred – with varying degrees of success – 
to the treatment of young insurgents, who were placed under the control of welfare and 
probation staff rather than the police or military officials who ran general detention.144  In 
Malaya, male insurgents under the age of eighteen were sent to the Advanced Approved School 
in Telok Mas, Malacca, for “training, education and reform”, which was said to produce good 
results, whilst approximately half of the female detainees under a similar regime at the Majeedi 
rehabilitation center were between fifteen and seventeen years old.145 Officials in Malaya 
“believed that if the Government could compensate for the lack of proper leadership, education, 
vocational training and family influence, such detained persons would be less susceptible to 
communist influence”.146 Unlike most African and Asian colonies, Cyprus lacked existing 
juvenile reformatories or borstals so establishing youth detention facilities was deemed an 
“urgent priority”, but one that apparently went unfulfilled due to limited resources.147 British 
Prison Commission officials brought to Cyprus to inspect the emergency detention regime 
advised on the rehabilitation program for the youth detainees being held at Kokkinotrimithia 
detention camp, arguing that any regime “must attach first importance to work”, supported by 
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games, hobbies, and education “designed to help individuals after their release”. Even so, their 
reports reveal a limited belief in the potential for “rehabilitation” under Emergency conditions, 
noting that no attempt should be made to force a “change of heart” in the boys as this could 
provoke a backlash and “a real effort will have to be made to prevent deterioration and further 
embitterment”.148  
It was in Kenya that the most developed, and seemingly effective, efforts at juvenile 
rehabilitation occurred, due to a combination of existing infrastructure and innovative 
leadership. Community development officials working at the main Manyani detention camp 
for boys dedicated themselves to reforming their charges and securing the necessary support 
and resources to enable a full rehabilitation program. Roger Owles wrote of his interactions 
with the boys: “Many could not control their tears. Some [tales] were stunning in their 
terribleness. I could hardly believe boys so young could be involved”.149 Owles was 
sympathetic to the boys but was clear that “let no man suggest they are anything other than a 
collection of Devils!”.150 Unlike Special Branch who warned that the boys were inveterate 
killers, Owles and his colleague Geoffrey Griffin believed that Mau Mau juvenile detainees 
were “reclaimable through school and discipline”.151 Colonial ideas of youth intersect with 
racialized presumptions here: Gikuyu boys were held to be more malleable and susceptible to 
paternalistic discipline and instruction that Greek Cypriots. To enact this juvenile 
rehabilitation, Wamumu Approved School was established in June 1956 to hold 1200 boys 
between sixteen and eighteen years of age. With its ethos of “truth and loyalty”, and its 
“indefinable atmosphere of a good boarding school”, Wamumu was the pinnacle of British 
colonial efforts to combat youth insurgency and became a showcase for rehabilitation, 
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deliberately crafted to counter the “gulag” image of the wider detention Pipeline.152 It was 
credited as the only successful rehabilitation program of the Mau Mau Emergency, with 
Governor Baring granting a full pardon to any boy who graduated from the camp.153 That 
success was due to its combination of juvenile reform techniques and its engagement with 
Gikuyu concepts of generational authority and initiation. Youth soldiers and “juvenile 
terrorists” were re-constructed as delinquent, disobedient, but reclaimable children: “we treat 
them entirely as ordinary schoolboys, never as wrongdoers, and we get a perfect response”.154 
As Ocobock argues, “emasculating and infantilizing the detainees in such as way solved the 
practical problem of trying to rehabilitate boys of varying ages, backgrounds and degrees of 
Mau Mau affiliation”.155 Whereas adult Mau Mau insurgents had been pathologized by the 
state for their violence, rehabilitation reframed youth insurgents as corrupted innocents who 
could be restored to a pristine childhood: but in doing so it rendered them passive and denied 
their political agency.156   
Wamumu offered an “alternative, state-sponsored rite of passage – a strange marriage 
of Gikuyu cultural life, colonial policy and carceral contingency”.157 Its rehabilitation program 
combined the focus on education found in other colonies with an emphasis on discipline and 
religion that were seen as necessary in the context of Mau Mau. Confession was used to 
“cleanse” the boys of their Mau Mau oaths and adherence, and an adapted Gikuyu initiation 
ceremony was used to mark a “reformed” boy’s transition into manhood, but with the state 
rather than community elders acting as gatekeepers of masculine authority.158 Owles stressed 
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that “[h]ard discipline meted out with sound and flawless justice is the best medicine for these 
boys”, but peer pressure was found to be most effective at combating unwanted behaviors, as 
“reformed boys” sought to make best advantage of the opportunities offered to them, an agentic 
expression to comply with adult, colonial norms that for them was a development of, and as 
valid as, their previous resistance.159 Vocational training and basic education were combined 
with physical training to reform juveniles in mind and body in an attempt to produce 
economically-productive colonial youth subjects. Perhaps most influentially however, 
Wamumu graduates were provided with secure jobs in various trades, farm labor, or the civil 
service – even Police Special Branch – providing them with wages and respect, thereby 
removing the central grievance that had driven many into Mau Mau.160 Ultimately, the success 
of Wamumu came not from its adherence to “hearts and minds” per se but from its provision 
of an accessible pathway to successful Gikuyu manhood, supported by committed mentoring 
and peer socialization. The boys responded to Wamumu’s reformative program not because it 




This article has argued that age and generation should be deployed as compelling analytical 
frameworks for understanding both insurgency and counterinsurgency; the failure to properly 
understand local experiences and norms of childhood and youth, and to tackle their motivations 
for insurgency, weakened colonial counterinsurgency programming, and continues to inhibit 
contemporary responses.161 Youth soldiers were a significant vector of anti-colonial insurgency 
across the globe, one which emerged in part from colonial states’ own constructions of 
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childhood and attempts to control youth. Their involvement suggests that anti-colonial 
insurgencies, which were fought over control of colonies’ futures, were supported by many of 
the generation who would come to inherit those futures. The legitimate grievances of youth 
were mobilized by anti-colonial groups, who recruited children through colonial youth 
organizations and as well as family, religious and social networks. Whilst some teenagers 
fought through coercion or necessity, others were genuinely politically motivated and willing 
to risk their lives and freedoms in the struggle for independence. Children and youth served in 
multiple capacities in anti-colonial insurgencies, in roles which were shaped by multiple, 
sometimes overlapping, logics: the need for troop fortification and sustained manpower; the 
tactical exploitation of youth liminality, and the symbolic mobilization of children and 
discourses of childhood innocence. Differences in the level or form of youth soldiering and 
insurgency were shaped by the availability of networks through which to mobilize youth, the 
nature of the conflict and armed groups, and by colonial responses. In Cyprus, children became 
prominent insurgents due to the ease with which they could be mobilized through schools, 
churches and youth organizations, and Grivas’ deliberate tactic of youth recruitment; in Kenya, 
urban youth gangs, family networks and oathing systems pulled many children into Mau Mau 
more informally. Child and youth participation in anti-colonial insurgencies established crucial 
examples of the political, military and symbolic significance of youth that were later developed 
across the globe in the armed liberation struggles and civil wars of 1970-2000s, shaping the 
phenomenon of contemporary child soldiering: whilst anti-colonial youth soldiering lacks the 
dehumanization and deliberate inversion of generational hierarchies that characterized the use 
of child soldiers in some contemporary conflicts like Mozambique or Northern Uganda, it 
demonstrates similar patterns of both coercive and voluntary recruitment, and of children and 
youth fulfilling both frontline and auxiliary roles in armed groups.162 In some instances, anti-
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colonial insurgencies established the tactics and logics of youth recruitment, the military and 
youth network structures, and the social contexts of youth militarization that helped to drive 
the systematic and extensive recruitment of children and youth in subsequent civil wars, from 
Cyprus to Palestine, Angola to Cambodia.163  
As conflict progressed, children and youth increasingly became regarded as legitimate, 
or at least necessary, targets of colonial violence and key objects of developmental 
interventions. Colonial counterinsurgency responses to youthful insurgents across British and 
French territories were broadly similar in that they combined violence and development, 
highlighting the tensions within late colonial governance: juveniles were beaten, detained, 
flogged, but also (re-)educated and trained to be economically-productive and politically-
acquiescent colonial subjects, (re-)constructed as “delinquents” rather than “terrorists” to 
facilitate their subsequent “rehabilitation”. But the exact extent and format of these 
counterinsurgency responses varied according to local socio-political contexts, 
counterinsurgency infrastructures, and cultures of youth: whereas Wamumu harnessed and 
‘modernized’ notions of Gikuyu youth masculinity in juvenile reform, education in Cyprus 
sought to ‘de-Hellenize’ and thereby depoliticize Greek Cypriot youth, and French traditions 
of colonial social engineering were deployed to combat the spread both of Communist youth 
identities in Indochina and against notions of Islamic modernity in Algeria.  
There is however a methodological tension between the empirical significance of youth 
soldiers and their relative absence in official and popular histories of liberation struggles. Youth 
soldiering is most prominent in colonial archives where it was most immediately visible in 
liberation struggles, due to urban conflict, media coverage and propaganda, and the large 
numbers of children who were brought into contact with colonial legal and welfare systems, as 
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in Kenya and Cyprus, but also where the problem was identified discursively as “juvenile” 
involvement, thereby harnessing pre-existing concerns about delinquency and youth revolt that 
threatened future colonial stability. Children and youth were also involved in other anti-
colonial conflicts, with further investigation required to demonstrate the extent of their 
significance in Palestine, Indonesia, Ireland and across Southern Africa. This article is a first 
step towards elucidating comparative patterns of youth soldiering and insurgency in 
decolonization struggles, and it is hoped intensive future research, particularly in district 
archives, combined with oral history approaches, will elucidate local variations in youth 
soldiering and colonial responses, and better recover the voices and experiences of children 
and youth who risked life and limb to fight for their, and their nations’, independence.  
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